

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

THE QUEST FOR PEACE: NATO ENLARGEMENT AND THE GEO-POLITICAL  
IMPLICATIONS OF EXPANDING THE TREATY THROUGHOUT EASTERN EUROPE

by

J. Wes Thompson, Major, United States Air Force

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Advisor: Dr. Edwina S. Campbell

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 2009

Distribution A: Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

Report Documentation Page			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188		
<p>Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.</p>					
1. REPORT DATE <b>APR 2009</b>	2. REPORT TYPE <b>N/A</b>	3. DATES COVERED <b>-</b>			
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b> <b>The Quest for Peace: NATO Enlargement and The Geo-Political Implications of Expanding the Treaty Throughout Eastern Europe</b>			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
			5b. GRANT NUMBER		
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b>			5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
			5e. TASK NUMBER		
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> <b>Air Command And Staff College Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama</b>			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
<b>9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b>			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
<b>12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> <b>Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</b>					
<b>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b>					
<b>14. ABSTRACT</b> <p><b>The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed sixty years ago as a defensive alliance, in response to the threat the Soviet Union and, eventually, the Warsaw Pact in general posed to Western Europe. Today, neither of those entities exists, yet NATO stands supreme as the institution most able to guarantee the security of its members, and the stability of the greater Euro-Atlantic area as a whole. With looming demographic challenges in Europe and a resurgent Russia asserting itself once more, many European nations are seeking NATO membership as a means of enhancing their security. For the United States (US), these developments present two primary policy options: disengage from the alliance and allow European institutions to cope with European issues; or maintain active US involvement and enlarge the alliance. In exploring these policy options, the following areas were examined: the major multinational European organizations (NATO, EU, OSCE) and how the Balkan Wars of the 1990s defined their contemporary roles; the demographic changes projected in Europe through 2050 and their potential destabilizing effects; and the nationalist policies of Vladimir Putin and the resurgence of an aggressive Russia. Tying these areas together with the history of NATO, its philosophical core, and the stabilizing effect it provides (to both members and those seeking membership), an argument is presented that ultimately advocates enlarging the NATO alliance.</b></p>					
<b>15. SUBJECT TERMS</b>					
<b>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</b> a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>			<b>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b> <b>SAR</b>	<b>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</b> <b>35</b>	<b>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</b>
b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>					
c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>					



### **Disclaimer**

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.

**Table of Contents**

Disclaimer .....	ii
Tables .....	iv
Acknowledgements .....	v
Abstract .....	vi
INTRODUCTION .....	1
GETTING TO NOW .....	3
WHAT FUTURE FOR NATO? US POLICY CONSIDERATIONS .....	16
CLOSING THOUGHTS .....	19
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	27

## Tables

Table 1: NATO and European Union Membership (as of April 2009) .....	2
Table 2: OSCE Membership (as of January 2009) .....	9
Table 3: Countries with Declining Populations (with year decline began) .....	11
Table 4: NATO Partnership for Peace Membership (as of April 2009) .....	20

## **Acknowledgements**

When I first discussed the proposed thesis of this monograph with a few individuals far more intelligent than I, “Beware the Pandora’s Box that is European geopolitics!” is the general response I received. Add to these warnings the fact that my advisor is a former US Department of State Foreign Service Officer with over thirty years of experience in European affairs (in both Government and Academic circles, often overlapping the two), and the limits of my own intelligence become painfully obvious. Nevertheless with intrepid spirit, I undertook a journey that began as a study of the Caucasus region and its prospects for stability, and ultimately culminated in a manifesto proposing the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Without the patient guidance (and indefatigable ability to answer “a quick question” or fifty) of Dr. Edwina S. Campbell, this paper would not have been coherent. A learned advisor who possesses the rare ability of making an academic discussion seem to be a casual chat between old friends, she encouraged me (a NATO neophyte) to challenge her (see above!) interpretation of European geopolitics (vis-à-vis NATO). The academic freedom she afforded (and the subsequent constructive criticism during thesis development), enabled me to explore the topic via my own (slightly skewed) cognitive process and for that, I am grateful.

And speaking of gratitude, this document would not have been finished were it not for the support, encouragement and understanding proffered by my wife Erin and our two amazing children. From the first days of research to the final (mostly late-night, away-from-home) composition sessions, their inspiration proved to be the difference between finishing my research, and finishing it with my sanity intact. My heartfelt thanks go to Erin, Cas and Sierra for their patience (and their hugs and kisses when I made it back just in time for stories at night!) during my self-imposed TDYs to the library. This is for your future...

## **Abstract**

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed sixty years ago as a defensive alliance, in response to the threat the Soviet Union and, eventually, the Warsaw Pact in general posed to Western Europe. Today, neither of those entities exists, yet NATO stands supreme as the institution most able to guarantee the *security* of its members, and the *stability* of the greater Euro-Atlantic area as a whole. With looming demographic challenges in Europe and a resurgent Russia asserting itself once more, many European nations are seeking NATO membership as a means of enhancing their security. For the United States (US), these developments present two primary policy options: disengage from the alliance and allow European institutions to cope with European issues; or maintain active US involvement and enlarge the alliance.

In exploring these policy options, the following areas were examined: the major multinational European organizations (NATO, EU, OSCE) and how the Balkan Wars of the 1990s defined their contemporary roles; the demographic changes projected in Europe through 2050 and their potential destabilizing effects; and the nationalist policies of Vladimir Putin and the resurgence of an aggressive Russia. Tying these areas together with the history of NATO, its philosophical core, and the stabilizing effect it provides (to both members and those seeking membership), an argument is presented that ultimately advocates enlarging the NATO alliance.

## INTRODUCTION

The year 2008 yielded a number of significant events that directly affected the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Of these events, the most dramatic was the Caucasus hostilities, in which two NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries (the Russian Federation and the Republic of Georgia)<sup>1</sup> actively engaged in combat operations against one another. This ordeal ultimately raised the question of NATO's relevance amidst a rising Russia in the post Cold War European arena. While this issue in and of itself deserves a careful study, a preliminary inquiry into it leads directly to deeper questions as one looks to the future of NATO: should the United States (US) pull back and let the European Union (EU) or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) supplant NATO (and the US) as the guarantor of European security, or should NATO enlargement continue throughout eastern Europe?

The two investigative thoughts above, regarding NATO's relevance and any future expansion of the treaty area, are inextricably linked. "The essential purpose of the North Atlantic Alliance is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members in Europe and North America in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter."<sup>2</sup> Now in its sixtieth year of successfully meeting that purpose, NATO's relevance as an institution is continually reaffirmed by the desire of non-member states to accede to the Alliance. If it is to remain relevant (in its quest to promote a peaceful Europe), NATO must continue to expand the umbrella of protection/security it provides to those countries that seek membership *and can meet membership requirements.*

Although the 'variable geometry' between those states that are members of the EU and not of NATO (or vice versa, see Table 1) continues to be reduced through the process of 'dual enlargement,'<sup>3</sup> the disparate role and influence of the US in those two organizations – external

Table 1: NATO and European Union Membership (as of April 2009)

NATO	The European Union
Albania	
	Austria
Belgium	Belgium
Bulgaria	Bulgaria
Canada	
Croatia	
	Cyprus
Czech Republic	Czech Republic
Denmark	Denmark
Estonia	Estonia
	Finland
France	France
Germany	Germany
Greece	Greece
Hungary	Hungary
Iceland	
	Ireland
Italy	Italy
Latvia	Latvia
Lithuania	Lithuania
Luxembourg	Luxembourg
	Malta
Netherlands	Netherlands
Norway	
Poland	Poland
Portugal	Portugal
Romania	Romania
Slovakia	Slovakia
Slovenia	Slovenia
Spain	Spain
	Sweden
Turkey	
United Kingdom	United Kingdom
United States	

**Source:** NATO, *NATO Members*, <http://www.nato.int/structur/countries.htm> (accessed 26 April 2009); and EU, *EU Members*, [http://europa.eu.abc/european\\_countries/eu\\_members/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu.abc/european_countries/eu_members/index_en.htm) (accessed 6 February 2009).

**Author's Note:** The table above was intentionally organized with gaps in each column to help graphically represent those nation-states that are members of both organizations, as well as those that only belong to one or the other.

ambassadorial representation versus (preeminent and currently globally hegemonic) founding nation – cannot be minimized. Considering the grand strategic policy concerns of the US, with an accompanying altruistic concern for regional stability, it is the thesis of this monograph that NATO expansion should continue throughout Eastern Europe, as those countries are of strategic importance to the Alliance. Although the EU is seeking to create a common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) within its (still not ratified) constitution, there is currently no other international organization that has the capability, or legitimacy, of NATO (and none that gives the US as large a voice) that could supplant it in maintaining the security of current or near/mid-term future treaty members throughout the greater Euro-Atlantic arena.

### **GETTING TO NOW**

To lay a foundation for the policy options available, a review of relevant background information is required. The NATO alliance, as an entity, is presented with a focus on its ultimate purpose and the underlying philosophy that makes it much more than a traditional military alliance. A look at the transformation of Europe and the ongoing evolution of the EU/OSCE, with respect to NATO, continues the discussion, including consideration of the projected demographics/economics of Europe circa 2050). The resurgence of an aggressive Russia (Vladimir Putin’s nationalistic rhetoric and energy policies anchor this area), and its relationship with NATO, closes the background portion of this paper. While the NATO information is presented as foundational, both the European and Russian areas are viewed more from the prism of the threats they may pose to the future. Both of the latter topic areas harbor the potential, left unchecked, to destabilize the European continent in a manner detrimental to the interests of both the US and our NATO/European allies. Their examination clarifies the

continued strategic importance of NATO and yields the two primary options facing the US (with regard to NATO) today: allow NATO to diminish; or expand the Alliance.

### ***NATO's Genesis***

In the years immediately following World War II, Western Europe faced domination by the growing Soviet empire. While less than one million American and British troops remained on continental Europe in mid-1946, the Soviets had over four million men in the field and had kept their armament industries running at war-time levels.<sup>4</sup> One year later, the war-ravaged economies of Western Europe were near collapse, and by the end of 1947, “Bulgaria, Roumania [sic], Hungary, Eastern Germany and Poland were all behind the iron curtain.”<sup>5</sup> Although the Marshall Plan addressed Europe’s post-war economic issues, the precarious security situation of the Western democracies was becoming clear. The Soviets’ veto power in the UN Security Council prevented formation of a viable defensive alliance within that organization, and with no Western European military capable of stopping an attack, “the Soviet(s) would have matters their own way”<sup>6</sup> should they decide to push west. Within this environment, the US abandoned the last vestiges of its isolationist past, altered its legal code (to allow entrance into a foreign alliance during peacetime), and joined eleven other states – Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom – in signing the North Atlantic Treaty.<sup>7</sup> By August 24th, 1949, the respective signatory states’ governments had ratified the treaty,<sup>8</sup> and NATO was born. For Western Europe, this was almost too late.

In 1945 the German Wehrmacht had been dismantled, and in 1949, the Bundeswehr was not yet formed, and a disarmed and occupied West Germany found itself on the front lines of the Cold War with neighbors that did not yet trust it. With the Soviet sphere of domination inching westward, “one of the main purposes of the Atlantic Charter [sic] was to ensure that Germany

would remain firmly anchored in Western Europe,”<sup>9</sup> with a US presence to forestall old security competitions that helped entangle the whole of the continent in the First World War. Although the presence of US forces enabled “Europeans to be comfortable with German recovery and rearmament,”<sup>10</sup> the military aspect was but one facet of the nascent NATO alliance.

The preamble to the Treaty states that NATO was “founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law [and that the members of the Alliance were] determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples.”<sup>11</sup> A reference to the common defense aspects of the Alliance was not mentioned until the last line of the preamble, and even this reference was couched in terms of a collective effort to preserve the peace *while* maintaining security.<sup>12</sup> The Treaty itself (Article 5 in particular) explicitly provides for the defense of Alliance members, but that is not the foundational soul of NATO. In the 1949 Senate hearings debating US accession, Secretary of State Dean Acheson clearly expressed this idea by stating, “the North Atlantic Treaty is far more than a defensive arrangement. It is an affirmation of the moral and spiritual values which we hold in common.”<sup>13</sup>

This line of reasoning defined NATO as an alliance which defended not just members’ sovereignty, but the very *ideals* upon which Western society was rebuilt following World War II. Members were not required to march lockstep regarding national policies, but having signed the Treaty, were expected to keep faith with its tenets, which would keep them entrenched in the “family of democracies” aligned against communism.<sup>14</sup> That other states may share those ideas and wish to contribute to, and benefit from, the alliance was recognized in Article 10 of the Treaty which stated that, “The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.”<sup>15</sup>

Thus, in its founding document, the seeds for NATO enlargement (which has brought the organization to its current complement of 28 nations) were sown. Although the very language used in Article 10 has led to controversy (e.g. what is a “European State?”; How is the “North Atlantic area” defined?), NATO enlargement was foreseen, expected and planned for from the outset. However, even Article 10 listed the requirement that a State be able to “further the principles of this Treaty” before the need for such a State to “contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.” This emphasis further defined NATO as a philosophical alliance of nations with common security concerns, vice being *solely* a military alliance whose members happened to share a common philosophy. Undoubtedly a subtle distinction, the fact that “the West” faced an overwhelming military power in 1949 (and that NATO was poised against that power for over forty years) has served to cloud the philosophical side of NATO from most casual observers.

### ***“Europe” and its Organizations***

Similar to NATO, the European identity has a degree of nuance that eludes clarity at first glance. While the EU increasingly represents a united political and security view (in addition to its steadily maturing economic functions), it “does not yet include all European democracies, and different views of Europe’s future among its members suggest that it will be years, if not decades, before the European Union equals ‘Europe’ in all its aspects.”<sup>16</sup> In 1975 the then CSCE, which unlike the EU, includes Europe’s North American allies (Canada and the US) as well as Russia, “was explicitly constituted to meet challenges of *conflict prevention* and *crisis management* and *resolution*” (emphasis added);<sup>17</sup> this implicitly placed the burdens of military action (should prevention fail and crises prove unmanageable by political means alone) beyond its purview. Though the EU and the OSCE have challenged NATO’s supremacy (in its role as the guarantor of European security) at times, they have thus far been found wanting. Indeed in

their current incarnations, they operate best when serving functions complementary to NATO's purpose (but beyond its mandate).

The current functions/roles of the EU, OSCE, and NATO itself were born out of the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s. "When NATO engaged the Serbian airforce [sic] in 1993 it was the first shot in anger which the alliance had ever fired."<sup>18</sup> This engagement, however, was undertaken only after the EU and the CSCE had proven impotent in their attempts to stop the violence. As the Cold War dramatically culminated in the early 1990s, the Yugoslav crisis was seen as a chance for the European Community (EC – the EU was formed from the EC following implementation of 1991's Maastricht Treaty in 1993)<sup>19</sup> to "hone its 'common foreign and security policy', and act independently of the Atlantic alliance through European institutions to solve a regional conflict."<sup>20</sup> This effort failed.

### ***The European Union***

In 1991 the French and German governments sought to create, within the EC construct, a common ESDP based on the forces of the Western European Union (WEU).<sup>21</sup> With the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia, this vision was put to the test. At the request of the French and British (who sought a "European response" to the crisis), the US did not conduct any diplomatic initiatives on its own.<sup>22</sup> Without belaboring the history, the EC negotiated a ceasefire to the hostilities, set up a monitoring mission, and asked the WEU to serve as its military enforcement arm. This initiative was unsuccessful because the WEU (paralyzed by internal disagreements) failed to act and with no military power in place to enforce the ceasefire, the ceasefire was "meaningless in the eyes of the belligerents."<sup>23</sup> The EC did precede the United Nations (UN) in placing sanctions on the various Yugoslav states, but the lack of a cohesive agreement on how to proceed (and no military means to back up any demands) left the EC open to Secretary of State

James Baker's May 1992 complaint that it "was doing nothing and simply waiting for the UN to act."<sup>24</sup>

The events discussed above all occurred while NATO nations were seeking to redefine the Alliance's purpose and functions in a post-Cold War world.<sup>25</sup> With the EC and WEU failures (and the UN's role restricted by Russia's position on the Security Council), it fell to NATO to end the Balkan bloodshed. Although there were stumbling blocks along the way, by 1995, through "NATO's successful show of force and the demonstration of its ability to coordinate military action...[it] established itself as Europe's only *meaningful* security institution"(emphasis added).<sup>26</sup> Ultimately, due to its lack of military capability and political strength, the EU's final role in the Balkans was limited to the realm of economic reconstruction.<sup>27</sup> The lessons of this experience would not be lost on Europeans when the ESDP was revisited later that decade.

### ***The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe***

The OSCE's (see Table 2 for current members) current *raison d'être* was, more so than even the EU's, shaped by the Yugoslav wars. Initially established in 1975 to "promote peaceful relations among states 'from the Atlantic to the Urals,'"<sup>28</sup> it survived a Russian attempt to use it to co-opt NATO in the 1990s (the initial idea behind the Soviets' 1970s CSCE participation) and emerged instead as the premier European organization regarding human rights concerns.

In the early 1990s the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE-OSCE's pre-1995 nomenclature), like all other multinational organizations centered on European affairs, sought to identify its purpose as the Soviet era ended. With an independent Russia (seeking to become a good global citizen) on the horizon, the Paris Charter was adopted by the CSCE in 1990. This defined "democracy, the rule of law, human rights, minority rights, political pluralism and respect for the environment [as the]...norms around which a CSCE 'security

community' would be" built.<sup>29</sup> That the CSCE was the only organization (of itself, the EU, and NATO) in which Russia enjoyed an equal status (with the other "great powers" in the Euro-Atlantic area) led Moscow to promote the CSCE as the dominant body for European political activities. In a dramatic display of *realpolitik*, however, the Russians (as the dominant voice speaking for the "still surviving" Soviet Union at the time), undermined that goal themselves.

Table 2: OSCE Membership (as of January 2009)

Albania	Andorra	Armenia
Austria	Azerbaijan	Belarus
Belgium	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Bulgaria
Canada	Croatia	Cyprus
Czech Republic	Denmark	Estonia
Finland	France	Georgia
Germany	Greece	Holy See
Hungary	Iceland	Ireland
Italy	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan
Latvia	Liechtenstein	Lithuania
Luxembourg	The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	Malta
Moldova	Monaco	Montenegro
Netherlands	Norway	Poland
Portugal	Romania	Russian Federation
San Marino	Serbia	Slovak Republic
Slovenia	Spain	Sweden
Switzerland	Tajikistan	Turkey
Turkmenistan	Ukraine	United Kingdom
United States of America	Uzbekistan	

**Source:** OSCE, *OSCE Membership*, <http://www.osce.org/about/13131.html> (accessed 6 February, 2009).

In late 1991 the Russians, fearing that CSCE involvement in the Yugoslav War would be a prelude to operations in the (newly independent but still occupied) Baltics, requested that EC, vice CSCE, observers be sent to oversee the first Yugoslav ceasefire agreement.<sup>30</sup> Having been denied a peacekeeping role, the CSCE attempted to find a role for itself in the conflict. When

fighting resumed in 1992 (primarily between Serbia and Bosnia), however, it was constrained by Russia's actions (a supporter of Serbia, it held an opposing view of that conflict-compared to most western European states-and blocked many initiatives) and the lack of military capability to *make* the peace it sought to *enforce*. In June 1994, the Russian Foreign Minister proposed giving the CSCE oversight of the various other European organizations (EU, WEU, NATO's North Atlantic Cooperation Council, etc.) and granting it the "overriding responsibility for the maintenance of peace, democracy, and stability in Europe."<sup>31</sup> As the Western European states saw this as an attempt to diminish NATO and divide the west, the proposal gained no traction.<sup>32</sup> Though they saw the wisdom of including Russia in discussions on European security, Western Europeans were not willing to give Russia a veto power when it came to security policy. Ultimately, "the lesson of Bosnia was that institutions that included Russia [i.e. the UN and OSCE; although this statement applies equally to the non-Russian EU as well] were weak and could not provide security in Europe."<sup>33</sup>

Having survived this Russian overreach, the OSCE's role in Europe was (re)defined by the 1995 Dayton Accords (temporarily ending the Balkan conflicts). In the agreement, the OSCE was charged with "supervising the 1996 Bosnian elections, monitoring human rights activity, and promoting arms control."<sup>34</sup> Building on that foundation, as the 1990s came to a close the OSCE became Europe's organization of choice for championing human rights, monitoring elections, mediating disputes and promoting democracy *while* "NATO provided the military backing required to give such efforts a chance to succeed."<sup>35</sup> Thus, just as the Balkan crisis solidified the economic role of the EU, the OSCE was ensconced in the role of "social services" coordinator for Europe. While many organizations in Europe had their identities redefined at the end of the twentieth century, Europe itself began a transformation as the twenty-first century dawned.

### ***The Dichotomy of Demography***

While the future remains unknowable, the countries of Europe are projected to undergo a demographical shift over the next forty years that poses a strategic concern for NATO. While the US population is expected to grow and experience only a slight median age increase (35.5 to 36.2)<sup>36</sup> between now and 2050, the European NATO allies (and “Europe” as a whole) represent the inverse, a shrinking population with a median age increasing from 37.7 to 47.<sup>37</sup> Of the eighteen countries currently experiencing population decline worldwide, seventeen of them are in Europe (See Table 3) – with eight more European countries expected to begin contracting by 2019.<sup>38</sup> It has been suggested that this dichotomy will result in the US maintaining a vibrant workforce (and proportional share of world GDP), while Europe will (collectively) diminish in terms of both its population and its economic position on the world stage.<sup>39</sup>

Table 3: European Countries with Declining Populations (with year decline began)

<b>In Decline as of 2009</b>		<b>Decline Projected by 2019</b>
Hungary (1981)	Moldova (1993)	Italy (2010)
Bulgaria (1986)	Belarus (1994)	Slovakia (2011)
Estonia ( 1990)	Russian Federation (1994)	Bosnia & Herzegovina (2011)
Georgia (1990)	Czech Republic (1995)	Greece (2014)
Latvia (1990)	Poland (1997)	Serbia (2014)
Armenia (1991)	Germany (2006)	Portugal (2016)
Romania (1991)	Croatia (2008)	Macedonia (2018)
Lithuania (1992)	Slovenia (2008)	Spain (2019)
Ukraine (1992)		

**Source:** UN, *World Population Prospects* (UN, 2007) as listed in Richard Jackson and Neil Howe, *The Graying of the Great Powers: Demography and Geopolitics in the 21st Century*, Center for Strategic and International Studies – Global Aging Initiative Report (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2008).

Concurrently, the immigration patterns in Europe will result in an expanding minority (increasingly Muslim) presence in European states. Immigrants from Turkey, North Africa and Middle-East/Asian countries are already being utilized to augment the available workforce and, as their numbers increase, “public anxieties about an influx of Muslim populations into Europe

have risen, sparked in part by numerous outbreaks of violence.<sup>40</sup> While their governments have attempted to assimilate these immigrants, a Pew research poll recently indicated that between 70 and 78 percent of citizens in Spain, Germany, Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands were either “somewhat” or “very concerned” about Islamic extremism.<sup>41</sup> With an aging/shrinking population (and an expanding immigrant cohort) Europe finds itself at a crossroads. As “Europe” attempts to identify itself via the EU construct, “most European NATO members are increasingly focusing on internal security, not defense, as a predominant concern.”<sup>42</sup> If Europe was indeed “whole, free, and at peace” (a common literary refrain used to describe the greater mission of NATO) with no potential external threats, this would not be of grave concern. That this is not the case is only highlighted by (what may be the “last gasp” of) a resurgent Russia.

### ***The Russian Federation***

In the mid- to late 1990s an economically crippled Russia, appearing as a pale shadow of its former superpower self, seemed poised for rapprochement with the West. Today, this proud, resource-rich and nuclear-armed nation has seemingly reverted once more into an authoritarian state that is seeking to reclaim the glory days of its former empire.

The breakup of the Soviet Union (and subsequent collapse of the Russian economy) has proven to have been an opportunity squandered. While the George H. W. Bush administration failed to “provide swift economic help to the democratic government of the newly independent Russia in 1992,”<sup>43</sup> it was outdone by the Clinton administration’s policy of dictating reforms to Russia (that proved to be quite painful for that nation as a whole) in return for economic aid.<sup>44</sup> While this arrangement lasted as long as “cooperation with the West seemed a necessary avenue”<sup>45</sup> for progress in Russia, a rise in global oil prices and the ascendance of a new president soon served as the prelude to a dramatic revival of Russian nationalism.

As the 1990s came to an end, “a little-known Russian official...published an article in a local magazine. Russia, he demanded, should ‘regain its former power’ by using its ‘natural resources potential.’”<sup>46</sup> The author making this demand was a former KGB officer named Vladimir Putin. Though the extent of his nationalistic bent was not readily apparent when he was inaugurated President in 2000, by 2005 (in his second term in office) Putin would make the remarkable (to “Western” audiences) statement that the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century”<sup>47</sup> had been the breakup of the Soviet Union. Utilizing new-found oil wealth to repurchase formerly state-owned private companies, he consolidated both economic and political power in Moscow by replacing the current company heads with loyalists he could trust. With both oil and commercial revenues filling the state coffers, Putin embarked on dramatic social programs and (in an effort to tie the masses even closer to him) began increasing nationalistic rhetoric at home while demanding to be dealt with as a “major power” abroad.<sup>48</sup> Thus “the first building block in Putin’s national concept [was] Soviet nostalgia...to harness this pride to the current Russian state.”<sup>49</sup> Unfortunately, a return to Soviet tactics was the second.

From his xenophobic portrayal of Russians who court western favor as “jackals”<sup>50</sup> to his utilization of Russia’s vast energy reserves as an external weapon and internal political asset,<sup>51</sup> Putin’s increasingly nationalist posture has highlighted the doublespeak of what he terms “sovereign democracy,”<sup>52</sup> but could easily be mistaken for “authoritarianism.”<sup>53</sup> While the Russian constitution limited Putin’s presidency to eight years, his hand-picked successor, Dmitry Medvedev, promptly named him Prime Minister when he stepped down as President in early 2008. Medvedev subsequently introduced a constitutional amendment expanding presidential terms from four to six years (maintaining a two-term limit). This move, codified in a bill approved by the Duma and Russia’s Federation Council, was largely viewed as an effort to pave

the way for Putin to return to the presidency for a twelve year span, capitalizing on the consolidation of power he has accomplished under the guise of “democratic reforms.”<sup>54</sup> Having ensconced himself as *the* power broker in Russia for the foreseeable future, Putin’s views on NATO (and the West in general) are Russia’s. This view is, at present, not a favorable one.<sup>55</sup>

The roots of Russian-NATO contemporary problems lay at the doorstep of the shattered Yugoslavia. Following the drama associated with the “first” Balkan Wars (1991-1995), the 1997 Russia-NATO Founding Act created the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC, predecessor of today’s NATO-Russia Council) as a confidence-building measure to increase dialogue between the two entities (and salve Russian pride, thus enabling the first “modern” round of NATO enlargement to proceed).<sup>56</sup> However in 1999, with the Balkan conflict reigniting in Kosovo, the relationship soured once more. NATO’s “New Strategic Concept,” released that year, contained a clause enabling non-Article 5 crisis response operations in non-member countries and was viewed by Russia as “part of a US strategy to establish global hegemony” that would upset the balance of power in Europe.<sup>57</sup>

When NATO subsequently began conducting combat operations against Serbia in support of Kosovo, Russia claimed that it was an illegal action that co-opted the rightful role of the UN and was particularly upset that NATO had not utilized the PJC to conduct extensive consultations regarding the issue.<sup>58</sup> In addition to its operating “out of area” for the first time, 1999 was a watershed year for NATO as it welcomed three former Warsaw Pact countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) into the Alliance. With the “illegality” argument mentioned above combining with the Russian Minister of Defense’s comments that NATO’s post-Cold War enlargement served to diminish “Russia’s geopolitical and military-strategic space,”<sup>59</sup> Russia appeared to be adopting a zero-sum *realpolitik* approach to NATO (despite the

PJC and other initiatives) just as Putin was about to take power. In 1999, Russia was assessed (by the Conflict Studies Research Centre) as having “neither the sticks nor the carrots to intimidate or beguile” European countries away from NATO’s New Strategic Concept<sup>60</sup> or from NATO itself. However, a rise in natural resource wealth would soon alter that reality.

In 1998, the Russian financial system suffered a complete meltdown. On August 17, the majority of its banks closed and the government defaulted on its foreign debt. By August 2007, the Russian coffers held \$540 billion of oil wealth and Putin increased defense spending, began addressing infrastructure problems, enacted massive social programs, and reinstated the Soviet policy of sending bombers on patrol missions far from Russia’s borders.<sup>61</sup> These actions invoked such pride in the Russian people that, in July 2007, the Governor of St. Petersburg declared that Russia had rediscovered its self-respect and that Russians had “overcome our inferiority complex.”<sup>62</sup> Solvent once more, in the August 2008 military adventure in the Georgian enclave of South Ossetia and the January 2009 (and prior) natural gas shutoff to Ukraine, Russia proved its willingness to use both its military and natural resources as weapons against countries in its “near abroad” (that, not coincidentally, had been seeking closer relations with the West).

Against this backdrop, Russia (much like the rest of Europe)<sup>63</sup> is projected to undertake a dramatic demographic transformation over the next forty years, with the population shrinking so rapidly it has been described as having “no historical precedent in the absence of pandemic.”<sup>64</sup> According to forecasters, even with immigration Russia can expect to lose nearly one-third of its population, declining from 145.5 million to 104.3 million people (of which Muslims, both native and immigrant, will approach the majority) by 2050.<sup>65</sup> The effects of this demographic shift and the global economic downturn that began in late 2008 cannot be completely foreseen, but only add to the concerns about the potential Russia has for destabilizing the European continent.

What long-term impact Putin's (and his protégé, Dmitry Medvedev's) policies may have on NATO remains debatable. However, in deference to the strategic concerns (on the part of NATO member states and Europe as a whole) that accompany these policies, they demand the Alliance's consideration. That Russia chose to unleash its armed forces on Georgia (a comparatively "tiny" neighboring state), during a time when NATO and "the West" were focused on Afghanistan and Iraq, may well speak to the current limited capabilities of Russian military power. However, with the EU dependent upon Russia for 44% of its natural gas (78% of which passes through Ukraine) and 18% of its oil,<sup>66</sup> energy resources have become a weapon as well, and Russia has shown no compunction in wielding it as such.

### **WHAT FUTURE FOR NATO? US POLICY CONSIDERATIONS**

Considering the factors discussed to this point, a policy dilemma for the US (as it regards NATO) has emerged. With a graying/diversifying Europe and a world transformation that is seeing Europe diminish from its colonial/20th century importance, an argument could be made that the transatlantic relationship requires a reevaluation. Given the European states' continuing quest to identify "Europe" via the EU, the US could disengage from NATO and allow it to slowly diminish, letting Europe contend with its own issues via the EU or OSCE. Alternatively, America could seek to enlarge NATO and keep the alliance strong, serving as a stabilizing security umbrella in the midst of a changing world order and a (temporarily?) resurgent Russia.

#### ***Disengage from the Alliance...at the US' own Peril***

The primary advantage of the first course of action is that it would disentangle the US from a treaty obligation to deal with any future European chaos. Although isolationism has not proven effective in the globalized age, disengaging from NATO could force the Europeans to establish a *viable* European security apparatus. Given the concerns detailed above, such

disengagement could serve to extricate the US from European security affairs only temporarily, requiring a subsequent reengagement to restore stability (in the interest of national, vice Alliance concerns). This is essentially what occurred in the 1990s, and indeed the 1940s as well. While the EU's rhetoric regarding ESDP led Washington to believe "that the European allies would finally make a major contribution to political-military burden-sharing outside Europe,"<sup>67</sup> this belief was crushed by the EU and OSCE's utter failure to effectively address situations in central Europe itself (i.e. the greater Yugoslav/Balkan crises of the 1990s).

Should the US disengage from NATO, it is unlikely the organization would survive, thereby forcing the US' non-EU NATO allies to seek other security arrangements. Although the European "pillar" has been strengthened (via a NATO-EU force-sharing construct), some have "underestimated the degree to which the United States was, and still is, NATO."<sup>68</sup> NATO decisions are made by consensus, but the US view normally (though significantly, not always) carries the day, while its military provides the preponderance of forces. Although there have been intra-NATO disagreements, a US-backed NATO has been credited with preventing a "security dilemma" in Europe following the Cold War.<sup>69</sup> Without NATO, the US' voice in European affairs would be limited to its ambassadorial relationship to the EU, and to the OSCE (where it would have a co-equal voice with Russia, which has used its voice to obstruct initiatives in the past). From a self-interest point of view, neither option serves US policy well.

Additionally it must be remembered that NATO, far from being just a military alliance, represents the *ideas* that form the core of the Western "Family of Democracies." An America that turned its back on NATO could be seen as an America that abdicated its leadership (of the global movement advocating democratic governments and market economies)<sup>70</sup> and have the same destabilizing effects as the Senate's post-World War One refusal to support US

membership in the League of Nations. While some in Europe have attempted to stress “Europe” at the expense of the US, they were nonetheless “insulted by American indifference”<sup>71</sup> to NATO participation in the Afghanistan War as the US developed its overall War on Terror strategy in late 2001 and 2002. Despite the ensuing “crisis,” it was still noted by all sides that “what made the transatlantic alliance special was the fact that it still stood in defense of core values such as individual liberty, democracy, and the rule of law.”<sup>72</sup> Given this statement, an abandonment of NATO is hardly compatible with America’s stated goal of promoting these very ideas.

***Enlarge the Alliance, Expand the Stability***

Considering the negative attributes of the scenario above, a US approach that seeks a responsible policy of NATO enlargement presents a more attractive picture. In defense of enlargement, it has been suggested that “the motivating influence of NATO membership, its normative power to encourage accession candidates to consolidate their arrangements for the democratic, civilian control of armed forces, remains only as powerful as the prospect of membership.”<sup>73</sup> To lose the influence (regarding not only military concerns but adherence to democratic governments and free-market economies as well) that NATO holds over nations seeking accession, by placing a moratorium on future expansion, would be an error. The desire to join NATO is so strong that even the warring countries of the former Yugoslavia have begun modifying behaviors (in a positive fashion) in an effort to have a non-guaranteed *chance* at accession.<sup>74</sup> In light of the stability such behavioral modifications could afford Europe, NATO’s then Supreme Allied Commander (and current National Security Advisor, retired General Jim Jones) categorically stated in 2008 that “NATO’s door must remain open.”<sup>75</sup>

Through France and Germany/Greece and Turkey, NATO has demonstrated an ability to bind together old foes,<sup>76</sup> and while the EU has yet to approve a constitution, NATO’s “Decision

by Consensus”<sup>77</sup> has (though not without significant tests and some creative uses of the various NATO components) succeeded for nearly 60 years. While the EU seeks to bind Europe economically and politically, NATO has bound its members militarily in a stable zone of security. To exclude other nations (in the greater European area) would only invite them to create a rival bloc.<sup>78</sup> History bears witness to that being a poor option.

Enlargement cannot, however, happen so fast that it allows nations that are not ready (politically, economically, as well as militarily) to enter NATO just for the sake of expansion itself. For if a nation has not met the entry criteria prior to acceding, the Alliance would lose much of the leverage it had over that country to induce reform<sup>79</sup> (again making the case for further, but *conditional*, enlargement of NATO). Having strict accession criteria ensures that new members will be contributors to, and not merely consumers of, the security NATO provides.

### **Closing Thoughts**

Despite the advocacy inherent in the discussion above, NATO enlargement cannot continue indefinitely. With seas to the North, West, and South, Turkey already in NATO, and the Caucasus region generally viewed as the southeastern flank of Europe, one can identify the logical borders of an enlarged NATO. However, NATO’s area of *stability* (if not guaranteed *security*) can be expanded further via the PfP (see Table 4). The PfP’s primary purpose “is to increase stability, diminish threats to peace and build strengthened security relationships between individual Partner countries and NATO, as well as among Partner countries.”<sup>80</sup> As such, while not enlarging NATO, the “far-reaching political commitments”<sup>81</sup> PfP member-states must agree to ultimately extend NATO’s sphere of influence/stability. The coordination and confidence the PfP (and other NATO “dialogues”)<sup>82</sup> provide thus serve to expand NATO’s philosophy, while retaining a Euro-Atlantic core. NATO enlargement itself, however, must not be reckless.

Table 4: NATO Partnership for Peace Membership (as of April 2009)

Albania *	Armenia	Austria
Azerbaijan	Belarus	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Croatia *	Finland	The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Georgia	Ireland	Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic	Malta	Moldova
Montenegro	Russia	Serbia
Sweden	Switzerland	Tajikistan
Turkmenistan	Ukraine	Uzbekistan

**Source:** NATO, *NATO Partner Countries*, <http://www.nato.int/pfp/eapc-cnt.htm> (accessed 6 February 2009). \* These countries accessed to NATO as full members on 1 April 2009.

While enlarging, the Alliance must *consider* Russian concerns to ensure that additional chaos is not created in the name of added security. With President Medvedev stating that Russia “has regions where it has its privileged interests,”<sup>83</sup> NATO cannot appear to be proceeding in an offensive manner (a difficult proposition given that Russian leaders view NATO expansion as a *realpolitik* containment strategy meant to limit Russia’s power and influence).<sup>84</sup> But neither can it, in retaining the 1990s mantra of giving Russia a “voice and not a vote”<sup>85</sup> at the NATO table, disregard the self-determination of any nation that wishes to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty (and meets accession criteria). With a world economic crisis emptying its treasury and looming demographic issues,<sup>86</sup> Russia may soon face a choice between allying itself with China, the Gulf States, or the West to enhance and further its own security interests. NATO remains open to a future where Russia itself accedes,<sup>87</sup> and a stable Euro-Atlantic area would aid that choice.

In the final analysis, and given the extant/emerging global (e.g. non-Eurocentric) challenges to American interests, the idea that “the future of American foreign and defense policy would certainly be multilateral, but...not principally be transatlantic”<sup>88</sup> appears to be a valid prognostication. As the US looks ahead, however, it would do well to recall Samuel Huntington’s warning that “the futures of both peace and Civilization depend upon

understanding and cooperation among the political, spiritual, and intellectual leaders of the world's major civilizations. In the clash of civilizations, Europe and America will hang together or hang separately.”<sup>89</sup> While the primary interests on both sides of the Atlantic will undoubtedly continue to evolve over time, a strong NATO, with its successful history of emerging from crises with its bedrock principles intact,<sup>90</sup> represents the most viable and logical place for the US and its European allies to “hang together” and promote their mutual interests.

In 1959, as he attended his final ministerial conference, the first Secretary-General of NATO, Lord Ismay, categorically stated that “the North Atlantic Alliance is the best, if not the only, hope of peace...[and] above everything else, we must be united. And then all will be well.”<sup>91</sup> While one could argue that the qualifier “in the Euro-Atlantic area” must be added as we look to the future, this statement (while perhaps more idealistic in philosophy than it was in 1959) is nevertheless a contemporary clarion call to keep NATO strong. To accomplish this, future historians must record the final complement of NATO countries as a number somewhat larger than its current twenty-eight. Then, with a Europe “whole, free, and at peace” and a stable Euro-Atlantic area, all may truly be well.

---

<sup>1</sup> NATO, *NATO TRANSFORMED* (Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization Public Diplomacy Division, 2004), 16.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 2

<sup>3</sup> Graeme Herd, *Variable Geometry & Dual Enlargement: From The Baltic to The Black Sea* (Surrey, UK: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2003), 1.

<sup>4</sup> General the Lord K. G. Ismay, *The Memoirs of General Lord Ismay*, (New York: The Viking Press, 1960), 454.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 454.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 454.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 454-455.

<sup>8</sup> NATO, “The North Atlantic Treaty,” Note 3, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm>.

<sup>9</sup> Robert W. Rauchhaus, ed, *Explaining NATO Enlargement* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001), 14.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 144.

<sup>11</sup> NATO, “The North Atlantic Treaty,” Preamble.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., Preamble.

<sup>13</sup> Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO, The European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 4.

<sup>14</sup> NATO has sometimes overlooked these requirements in an effort to gain influence over a particular area (Spain via Portugal as one example). Greece and Turkey's entry, as a defensive line for NATO's southeastern flank, is a prime example. For an excellent discussion of how and why these countries were able to initially enter (and later remain in) NATO despite actions/governments that were contrary to the spirit of the Treaty, see Fotios Moustakis, *The Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003).

<sup>15</sup> NATO, "The North Atlantic Treaty," Article 10.

<sup>16</sup> Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO, The European Union*, 249.

<sup>17</sup> Martin Kahl, "NATO Enlargement and Security in a Transforming Eastern Europe: The Question of Adequacy," in *NATO Looks East*, eds Piotr Dutkiewicz and Robert J. Jackson (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), 31.

<sup>18</sup> Christopher Cocker, "The Geopolitical Implications of the Expansion of Europe," in *NATO Looks East*, eds Piotr Dutkiewicz and Robert J. Jackson (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 7. Though NATO agreed to enforce the no-fly zone in 1993, it was actually January 1994 before a NATO aircraft engaged and fired upon a Serbian one.

<sup>19</sup> Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO, The European Union*, 184.

<sup>20</sup> Beverly Crawford, "The Bosnian Road to NATO Enlargement" in *Explaining NATO Enlargement*, ed. Robert W. Rauchhaus (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001), 43.

<sup>21</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, "NATO Expansion: A Realist's View" in *Explaining NATO Enlargement*, ed. Robert W. Rauchhaus (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001), 29. See multiple (indexed) references within the parent book for an expanded description and discussion of the WEU.

<sup>22</sup> Beverly Crawford, "The Bosnian Road", 44.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 44.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 44.

<sup>25</sup> With the Cold War ending and most nations looking to focus on internal issues, the NATO allies were struggling with how to adapt the Alliance in light of what President George H.W. Bush (and others) deemed the "New World Order." See Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO, The European Union*, 95.

<sup>26</sup> Beverly Crawford, "The Bosnian Road", 54-55. A perusal of this article as a whole expands the numerous multi-agency efforts attempted by the Europeans to solve the Yugoslav crisis prior to NATO's full involvement and ascendance to lead-organization status.

<sup>27</sup> Beverly Crawford, "The Bosnian Road", 54.

<sup>28</sup> Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO, The European Union*, 9.

<sup>29</sup> Pál Dunay, *The OSCE in Crisis*, Chaillot Paper no. 88 (Conde-sur-Noireau, France: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2006), 69.

<sup>30</sup> Beverly Crawford, "The Bosnian Road", 44. Though an "extra-European" organization, the United Nations also suffered from Russia's rhetoric and counter-view (via its position on the Security Council) during the Yugoslav Wars. See Ms. Crawford's complete essay for a well-documented, yet concise, discussion of this topic.

<sup>31</sup> Martin Kahl, "NATO Enlargement and Security," 32.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 32. Russia favored a "multipolar" world where the UN would be the main security organization and the OSCE (of which Russia could claim a prime role and thus satisfy its "great power" ambitions) would provide overall security for Europe. See Dr. M.A. Smith, *Russian Thinking on European Security After Kosovo* (Surrey, UK: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 1999), 6.

<sup>33</sup> Beverly Crawford, "The Bosnian Road," 40.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 54.

<sup>35</sup> Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO, The European Union*, 147.

<sup>36</sup> Jeffrey Simon, "NATO's Uncertain Future: Is Demography Destiny?" *Strategic Forum*, no. 236 (October 2008): 3.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>38</sup> Richard Jackson and Neil Howe, *The Graying of the Great Powers: Demography and Geopolitics in the 21st Century*, Center for Strategic and International Studies – Global Aging Initiative Report (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2008), 3.

<sup>39</sup> Jeffrey Simon, “NATO’s Uncertain Future,” 6. See also Jackson and Howe, “The Graying of the Great Powers,” 6 for another view of this potentiality.

<sup>40</sup> Jeffrey Simon, “NATO’s Uncertain Future,” 5. See referenced text for the complete discussion. The security concerns mentioned, however, include: the March 11, 2004 train bombings in Madrid; the November 2004 assassination of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh; the July 2005 London bombings; the French street violence and car bombings of 2005; and the widespread/multi-national riots that occurred following the February 2006 publication of cartoons in a Danish newspaper that some Muslims found offensive.

<sup>41</sup> In addition to the concerns about extremism, the fertility rate for Europe’s Muslim population is about three times that of non-Muslims, adding an additional dimension to the transformation of Europe discussed above. Not only is Europe getting older and smaller overall, but its proportion of Muslims (as a percentage of total population) will rapidly increase in the coming decades. See Jeffrey Simon, “NATO’s Uncertain Future,” 5

<sup>42</sup> Jeffrey Simon, “NATO’s Uncertain Future,” 3. This emphasis is reflected in European defense budgets that overwhelmingly fail to meet the 2% of Gross Domestic Product standard set by NATO. See complete referenced text for an expanded discussion/overview of the budgets in question.

<sup>43</sup> Dmitri K. Simes, “Losing Russia,” *Foreign Affairs* 86, Issue 6 (November/December 2007): 36-52.

<sup>44</sup> The Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev (known in Russia as “Mr. Yes” for his habit of accommodating Western wishes) ultimately told President Clinton’s Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, that “it’s bad enough having you people tell us what you’re going to do whether we like it or not. Don’t add insult to injury by also telling us that it’s in our interests to obey your orders.” (Dmitri K. Simes, “Losing Russia,” 38).

<sup>45</sup> Margarita Assenova, *The Debate on NATO’s Evolution*, Center for Strategic and International Studies – Eastern Europe Project (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2003), 44.

<sup>46</sup> Jonathan Eyal, “Europe’s Defences: Wake-up Time,” *Europa World Online*, Winter 2008, <http://www.europaworld.com/entry/we.essay.2> (accessed 5 November 2008).

<sup>47</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Putin’s Choice,” *The Washington Quarterly* 31, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 95-116 (97).

<sup>48</sup> During the early to mid 2000s Putin’s consolidation of power covered all areas of daily life to include media outlets. Having suffered an economic meltdown in 1998, the surge in oil/natural gas prices that accompanied Putin’s rise to the Presidency offered him the chance to carry out this consolidation (speaking diplomatically; some have referred to it as a return to authoritarianism) without challenge by the majority of Russians. Even though they could see what Putin was doing, the average Russian’s “lot in life” was getting better and Putin’s actions on the world stage allowed them to feel pride at being “Russian” once more. See Marshall I. Goldman, “The New Imperial Russia,” *Demokratizatsiya*, vol.16 (Winter 2008): 9-15; Richard Rose and Neil Munro, “Do Russians see their future in Europe or the CIS,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 60, no. 1 (January 2008): 49-66; and Steven Woehrel, CRS Report for Congress: *Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries*, RL34261 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008).

<sup>49</sup> Sarah E. Mendelson and Theodore P. Gerber, “Us and Them,” *The Washington Quarterly* 31, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 131-150 (131).

<sup>50</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Putin’s Choice,” 95.

<sup>51</sup> Steven Woehrel, “Russian Energy Policy,” 2-3,8; Salient points are that energy resources are supplied at well-below market cost in Russia, appeasing a struggling electorate, while on December 31, 2006, (this document’s example of using energy as a weapon; Jan 1, 2009 offers the most recent example) Russia cut off natural gas deliveries to Ukraine, and most of Europe by default, over what Russia claimed was a pricing disagreement.

<sup>52</sup> Rose and Munro, “Do Russians see their future in Europe or the CIS,” 52.

<sup>53</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Putin’s Choice,” 100.

<sup>54</sup> TransWorldNews, “Russia Approves Bill to Extend Presidential Term Limits,” <http://www.transworldnews.com/NewsStory.aspx?id=71352&cat=11> (accessed 1 February 2009).

<sup>55</sup> A 2007 survey found that by a margin of 69-31%, Russians see their future as lying with the countries that comprise the “Commonwealth of Independent States,” see Rose and Munro, “Do Russians see their future in Europe or the CIS,” 53. For an exceptional study on the world views of the “Putin Generation” (defined as Russians age 16-

<sup>29</sup> see Mendelson and Gerber “Us and Them: Anti-American Views of the Putin Generation”; salient points are that the “Putin Generation” (in 2007): overwhelmingly approved of Putin’s policies (80+%); believed that Stalin did more good than ill; held anti-American views (70-80%); and labeled America an “enemy” or “rival” (64%; of significance, only 44% of respondents identified Georgia as an adversary at that time).

<sup>56</sup> The Founding Act is formally titled the “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and The Russia Federation” and was signed two and one-half years after the NATO allies agreed to study why and how NATO enlargement should occur (in response to newly independent states’ - in Central/Eastern Europe - requests to join the alliance). See Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO, the European Union*, 155-156; and Part 1 Section III of *NATO, The NATO Handbook*, (Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization Public Diplomacy Division, 2006), also available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/index.htm>.

<sup>57</sup> Dr. M.A. Smith, *Russian Thinking*, 4.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>61</sup> Marshall I. Goldman, “The New Imperial Russia,” 11.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>63</sup> There has been an on-going debate within Russia (for over 300 years) regarding whether or not to “Westernize” and enhance its European nature at the expense of forsaking its Asian continental side. “Russia was and is both European and Asian, and will not fall completely into either camp, nor forsake either continent’s legacy. As much as Russia feels itself to be a part of a larger Europe, it also considers itself to be a global and Eurasian power....the result is that in many ways, Russians feel that they do not belong fully to East or West, and thus have their own special history and calling in the world.” See Lieutenant Colonel Gordon B. Hendrickson, *The Future of NATO-Russian Relations, or How to Dance with a Bear and not get Mauled*, Walker Paper. No. 6 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2006), 15.

<sup>64</sup> Jackson and Howe, “The Graying of the Great Powers,” 10.

<sup>65</sup> Jeffrey Simon, “NATO’s Uncertain Future,” 5; the reference to Muslims approaching the majority at that time reflects not only Russia’s similarities with Europe’s demographics, but serves as a warning regarding how the Russian Federation has handled Muslim issues (read: Chechnya) in the past.

<sup>66</sup> Steven Woehrel, “Russian Energy Policy,” 1,7.

<sup>67</sup> Edwina S. Campbell, “From Kosovo to the War on Terror: The Collapsing Transatlantic Consensus, 1999-2002,” *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 1, no. 1 (Fall 2007): 72. Beverly Crawford eloquently expands this thought stating, “Security concerns arising from fighting in Bosnia, coupled with Europe’s inability to act and Russia’s obstructionism, made it clear that US leadership was necessary.” See Beverly Crawford, “The Bosnian Road,” 13.

<sup>68</sup> Robert W. Rauchhaus, *Explaining NATO Enlargement* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001), 13.

<sup>69</sup> Far from being an American-centric viewpoint, this idea is shared by some in Europe as well. Regarding centers of power in Europe, one diplomat stated that “it is not acceptable that the lead nation be European. A European power broker is a hegemonic power. We can agree on US leadership, but not on one of our own.” While this was uttered in 1989 and may have been true up through 2000, a strong argument could be made that this is no longer the case. See Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989), 15.

<sup>70</sup> While it did not consider a US withdrawal from NATO, a 1992 Congressional Research Service report makes a persuasive case for NATO enlargement based on the expanding democracy and free market themes. See Stanley R. Sloan, *The Future of U.S.-European Security Cooperation*, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 92-907 (Washington D.C.: CRS, Decemeber 4, 1992), 2-3.

<sup>71</sup> Edwina S. Campbell, “From Kosovo to the War on Terror,” 51.

<sup>72</sup> Stanley R. Sloan, *How and Why Did NATO Survive the Bush Doctrine*, Report for the NATO Defense College Research Division (Rome: NATO Defense College, October 2008), 8.

<sup>73</sup> Graeme Herd, *Variable Geometry & Dual Enlargement*, 7. This is in stark contrast to the OSCE, which has an “inclusive” membership policy whereby it does not set conditions of membership for those countries that wish to join it (indeed the OSCE works on a concept of “participating states” in an undefined Euro-Atlantic area; of note, African/Middle-Eastern states that border the Mediterranean Sea have been granted only “observer” status). It has been suggested that while NATO and the EU are able to markedly influence those nation’s that wish to join them with the stringent pre/post-accession requirements placed on potential members, the OSCE (with its inclusive membership) holds no such sway and loses the ability to influence its members once they have joined. See also Pál Dunay, *The OSCE in crisis*, 25.

<sup>74</sup> Graeme Herd, *Variable Geometry & Dual Enlargement*, 6-8.

<sup>75</sup> Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *NATO: Enlargement and Effectiveness*, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., 2008, Committee Print, 15.

<sup>76</sup> Historical enemies (somewhat) united by a common enemy (the USSR) during the Cold War, Greece and Turkey immediately saw the other as their main threat at the end of the Cold War (and through various parts of it as well). For an exhaustively resourced and comprehensively analyzed view of all things Turkish and Greek, as they relate to NATO (to include why two states that could not claim to meet membership requirements were invited to join the alliance), see Fotios Moustikas, *The Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003). As the author of that text observed on page 56, despite the ongoing Cypress issue and their inability to agree on almost anything, “both countries (including Greek and Turkish elites) have acknowledged that NATO is probably the only organization which can play a useful role in bringing the two sides together.”

<sup>77</sup> NATO, “Consensus Decision-Making at NATO,” <http://www.nato.int/issues/consensus/index.html> (accessed 29 October 2008).

<sup>78</sup> The argument here is based on historical precedent regarding the various entangling alliances that dragged all of Europe into the World Wars (the first in particular). For an entirely plausible scenario of what *could* have happened had NATO not conducted post-Cold War expansion, see Jonathan Eyal, “Europe’s Defences: Wake-up Time.”

<sup>79</sup> Margarita Assenova, *The Debate on NATO’s Evolution*, 23.

<sup>80</sup> NATO, *Security Through Partnership* (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization Public Diplomacy Division, 2005), 10.

<sup>81</sup> The salient point is that PfP member-states, while identifying the areas of cooperation they wish to participate in, must also pledge to “preserve democratic societies; to maintain the principles of international law; to fulfill obligations under the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act and international disarmament and arms control agreements; to refrain from the threat or use of force against other states; to respect existing borders; and to settle disputes peacefully.” See *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>82</sup> NATO has already established a “Mediterranean Dialogue” and “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative” to increase bilateral relations and enhance security cooperation with non-NATO countries in the Mediterranean and Middle-East regions respectively. For the organization’s philosophy regarding the goals of these partnerships, see NATO, *Security Through Partnership* (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization Public Diplomacy Division, 2005).

<sup>83</sup> Paul Reynolds, “New Russian World Order,” *BBC News*, 1 September 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Europe/7591610.stm> (accessed 4 September 2008).

<sup>84</sup> See Gordon G. Hendrickson, *The Future of NATO-Russian Relations*, 41; Jonathan Eyal, “Europe’s Defences: Wake-up Time,” (third paragraph from the end); and Stanley R. Sloan, *How and Why Did NATO Survive the Bush Doctrine*, 7.

<sup>85</sup> This was a common refrain throughout the 1990s as the post-Soviet Russian role in Europe was discussed. Although multiple references are available, see Martin Kahl, “NATO Enlargement and Security,” 24, for a brief overview of the policy decisions that ultimately led to Russia’s “Special Status” as a member of NATO’s PfP and the creation of the NATO-Russia Council.

<sup>86</sup> See Helen Cooper and Scott L. Malcomson, “Rice Looks Back on Bush’s Foreign Policy,” *International Herald Tribune*, 14 November 2008, <http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/11/14/america/rice.php> (accessed 15 November 2008); and Jackson and Howe, “The Graying of the Great Powers,” 5.

<sup>87</sup> Although the current regime of Russian leaders have expressed no interest in doing so (See Gordon G. Hendrickson, *The Future of NATO-Russian Relations*, 41), the North Atlantic Treaty's verbiage clearly makes Russia eligible for membership (see NATO, *The North Atlantic Treaty*; and the NATO, "Enlargement," <http://www.nato.int/Issues/enlargement/index.html>). However to be a viable candidate, Russia would have to adhere as well to the tenets set forth in NATO's 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement [See NATO, *Study on NATO Enlargement* (Brussels, Belgium: NATO On-Lin Library, 2005), <http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9501.htm> (downloaded 31 January 2009), Ch 5] something that it is unlikely to attempt in the near-term.

<sup>88</sup> Edwina S. Campbell, "From Kosovo to the War on Terror," 72.

<sup>89</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 321.

<sup>90</sup> Though there have been many disagreements among the NATO allies (the Suez episode/France's withdrawal from the Integrated Military Command structure/etc.) the "Transatlantic Crisis" of the early/mid 2000s is the most recent and significant, as it occurred after NATO's historic nemesis (the Soviet Union) had dissolved. For an excellent summary of this chapter in NATO's history (to include "lessons learned" regarding NATO's future), see Stanley R. Sloan, *How and Why Did NATO Survive the Bush Doctrine*.

<sup>91</sup> General the Lord K.G. Ismay, *The Memoirs of General Lord Ismay*, 463.

## Bibliography

Assenova, Margarita. *The Debate on NATO's Evolution-A Guide*. A Report of the CSIS Eastern Europe Project. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2003.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "Putin's Choice." *The Washington Quarterly* 31, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 95-116.

Campbell, Edwina S. "From Kosovo to the War on Terror The Collapsing Transatlantic Consensus, 1999–2002." *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 1, no. 1 (Fall 2007): 36-78.

Coker, Christopher. "The Geopolitical Implications of the Expansion of Europe." In *NATO Looks East*. Edited by Piotr Dutkiewicz and Robert J. Jackson. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998.

Cooper, Helen, and Scott L. Malcomson. "Rice Looks Back on Bush's Foreign Policy." *International Herald Tribune*, 14 November 2008. <http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/11/14/america/rice.php> (accessed 15 November 2008).

Crawford, Beverly. "The Bosnian Road to NATO Enlargement." In *Explaining NATO Enlargement*. Edited by Robert W. Rauchhaus. Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001.

Dunay, Pal. *The OSCE in Crisis*. Chaillot Paper, no. 88. Conde-sur-Noireau, France: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2006.

Eyal, Jonathan. "Europe's Defences: Wake-Up Time." *Europa World Online*, Winter 2008. <http://www.europaworld.com/entry/we.essay.2> (accessed 5 November 2008).

Hendrickson, Lieutenant Colonel Gordon B. *The Future of NATO-Russian Relations, or How to Dance with a Bear and not get Mauled*. Walker Paper No. 6. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2006.

Goldman, Marshall I. "The New Imperial Russia." *Demokratizatsiya* 16 (Winter 2008): 9-15.

Herd, Graeme. *Variable Geometry & Dual Enlargement: From The Baltic to The Black Sea*. Conflict Studies Research Centre, October 2003.

Ismay, K. G. *The Memoirs of General Lord Ismay*. New York: The Viking Press, 1960.

Jackson, Richard, and Neil Howe. *The Graying of the Great Powers: Demography and Geopolitics in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2008. [http://www.csis.org/component?option,com\\_csis\\_pubs/task,view/id,4453/](http://www.csis.org/component?option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,4453/) (accessed 10 November 2008).

Kahl, Martin. "NATO Enlargement and Security in a Transforming Eastern Europe: The Question of Adequacy." In *NATO Looks East*. Edited by Piotr Dutkiewicz and Robert J. Jackson. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998.

Keohane, Robert O. *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory*. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989.

Mendelson, Sarah E., and Theodore P. Gerber. "Us and Them: Anti-American Views of the Putin Generation." *The Washington Quarterly* 31, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 131-150.

Moustakis, Fotios. *The Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO*. Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003.

NATO. "Consensus Decision-Making at NATO." <http://www.nato.int/Issues/consensus/index.html> (accessed 29 October 2008).

NATO. "Enlargement." <http://www.nato.int/Issues/enlargement/index.html> (accessed 10 November 2008).

NATO. *SECURITY THROUGH PARTNERSHIP*. Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization Public Diplomacy Division, 2005.

NATO. *NATO TRANSFORMED*. Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization Public Diplomacy Division, 2004.

NATO. "The North Atlantic Treaty." <http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm> (accessed 21 October 2008).

NATO. *Study on NATO Enlargement*. Brussels, Belgium: NATO On-Line Library, 2000. <http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9501.htm> (accessed 31 January 2009).

Rauchhaus, Robert W., ed. *Explaining NATO Enlargement*. Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001.

Reynolds, Paul. "New Russian world order: the five principles." *BBC News*, 1 September 2008. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7591610.stm> (accessed 4 September 2008).

Rose, Richard and Neil Munro. "Do Russians see their future in Europe or the CIS." *Europe-Asia Studies* 60, no. 1 (January 2008): 49-66

Simes, Dmitri K. "Losing Russia." *Foreign Affairs* 86, Issue 6 (November/December 2007): 36-52.

Simon, Jeffrey. "NATO's Uncertain Future: Is Demography Destiny?" *Strategic Forum*, no. 236 (October 2008): 1-7.

Sloan, Stanley R. *The Future of U.S.-European Security Cooperation*, CRS Report for Congress 92-907. Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, December 1992.

Sloan, Stanley R. *How and Why Did NATO Survive the Bush Doctrine*, Report for the NATO Defense College Research Division. Rome: NATO Defense College, October 2008.

Sloan, Stanley R. *NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged*. 2nd ed. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005.

Smith, Dr. M.A. *Russian Thinking on European Security After Kosovo*. Surrey, UK: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 1999.

TransWorldNews. "Russia Approves Bill to Extend Presidential Term Limits." <http://www.transworldnews.com/NewsStory.aspx?id=71352&cat=11> (accessed 1 February 2009).

Waltz, Kenneth N. "NATO Expansion: A Realist's View." In *Explaining NATO Enlargement*. Edited by Robert W. Rauchhaus. Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001.

Woehrel, Steven. *CRS Report for Congress: Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries*, RL34261. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 17 January 2008.

### **Additional Suggested Reading**

Gardner, Hall, ed. *NATO and the European Union: New World, New Europe, New Threats*. Aldershot, Hants, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004.

Goldgeier, James M. "NATO Expansion: The Anatomy of a Decision." *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*. Edited by Wittkopf, Eugene R. and James M. McCormick. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004.

Hunter, Robert E., Sergey M. Rogov, and Olga Oliker. *NATO and Russia: Bridge-Building for the 21st Century*. RAND White Paper Report of the Working Grouop on NATO-Russia Relations. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Security Research Division, 2002.

Mariano, Stephen J. Lt Col. *Untangling NATO Transformation*. Martello Papers. Kingston, Ontario, Canada: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 2007.

NATO. "The North Atlantic Treaty and the UN Charter." [http://www.nato.int/issues/nato\\_treaty\\_un.charter/index.html](http://www.nato.int/issues/nato_treaty_un.charter/index.html) (accessed 21 October 2008).

NATO. "The Alliance's Strategic Concept." <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm> (accessed 20 October 2008).

NATO. *The NATO Handbook*. Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization Public Diplomacy Division, 2006. <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/index.htm> (accessed 10 November 2008).

NATO. “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation.” 27 May 1997. <http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/fndact-a.htm> (accessed 11 November 2008).

Oswald, Franz. *Europe and the United States: The Emerging Security Partnership*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International Publishers, 2006.

Schimmelfennig, Frank. *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Torbion, Kjell M. *Destination Europe: The Political and Economic Growth of a Continent*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2003.

Townsend, Jim. *The Moment has Arrived: NATO Membership for Albania, Croatia and Macedonia*. ACUS Issue Brief. Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council of the United States, March 2008.

Volker, Kurt. “Bucharest: NATO and the future of the Transatlantic Alliance.” Remarks at Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, 7 April 2008. US Department of State Website. <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/103423.htm> (accessed 20 October 2008).

Watkins, Amadeo. *PfP Integration: Croatia, Serbia & Montenegro*. Camberley, Surrey, UK: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 2004.

Williams, Geoffrey Lee, and Barkley Jared Jones. *NATO and the Transatlantic Alliance in the 21st Century: The Twenty-Year Crisis*. Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: PALGRAVE, 2001.